Renewable Energy Use as Environmental CSR Behavior and the Impact on Firm Profit by Hulshof, Daan & Mulder, Machiel
  
 University of Groningen
Renewable Energy Use as Environmental CSR Behavior and the Impact on Firm Profit
Hulshof, Daan; Mulder, Machiel
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Final author's version (accepted by publisher, after peer review)
Publication date:
2019
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Hulshof, D., & Mulder, M. (2019). Renewable Energy Use as Environmental CSR Behavior and the Impact
on Firm Profit. (SOM Research Reports; No. 2019009-EEF). Groningen: University of Groningen, SOM
research school.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the








































Renewable Energy Use as 
Environmental CSR Behavior and the 





















SOM is the research institute of the Faculty of Economics & Business at  
the University of Groningen. SOM has six programmes:  
-  Economics, Econometrics and Finance 
-  Global Economics & Management 
-  Innovation & Organization 
-  Marketing 
-  Operations Management & Operations Research 
-  Organizational Behaviour 
 
Research Institute SOM 
Faculty of Economics & Business 








P.O. Box 800 
9700 AV   Groningen 
The Netherlands 
 






























































Renewable Energy Use as Environmental CSR 





University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, 




University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, 






Renewable energy use as environmental CSR behavior and the
impact on firm profit
Daan Hulshof†‡ Machiel Mulder†
October 29, 2019
Abstract
Firms buy renewable energy at premiums and report environmental concerns as motivation
to do so. The bulk of the literature on environmental corporate social responsibility (CSR)
suggests that this type of behavior even results in higher profit. From a microeconomic
perspective, however, higher profit from environmental CSR activities is generally not ex-
pected. This paper investigates the relationship between firms’ renewable energy use and
profit by analyzing panel data for 920 firms over 2014–2018. We find no relationship between
renewable energy use and profit. Hence, a win-win in the form of higher profit and a better
environment does not seem to exist. In addition, it appears that firms do not have a positive
willingness to pay for renewable energy as contribution to the environment.
Key words: Renewable energy use, Environmental CSR, Profit maximization, Theory of
the firm, Product differentiation
1 Introduction
An increasing number of firms uses renewable energy with the intention to “combat climate
change” (Apple, 2018), “contribut[e] to the reduction of carbon [emissions]” (Nestle, 2018) or
“reduc[e] the environmental footprint” (Volkswagen, 2017). These public announcements seem
to suggest that these firms are motivated by environmental concerns when they buy renewable
energy, particularly considering that renewable energy is generally more expensive than non-
renewable energy. For example, in the case of renewable electricity (applying to the three cited
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firms), firms that want to claim the use of renewable electricity typically acquire renewable
electricity certificates in addition to the electricity itself. The wholesale price of European
renewable energy certificates (Guarantees of Origin) was approximately e 2 per MWh in 2018
(Greenfact, 2018). Prices of certain specific certificates are even much higher, such as Dutch
wind certificates, which had a price of more than e 7 per MWh in 2018.1
Considering that buying these renewable energy certificates does not affect at all firms’
technological processes, the question emerges how renewable energy use is related to the general
objective of the firm according to microeconomic theory, which is to maximize profit. More
general, this question appears relevant for most corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions of
firms. CSR may be referred to as actions that are beneficial to society, not directly beneficial
to the firm and not required by law (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Environmental CSR can
be considered the subgroup of actions which are related to environmental concerns, such as
reducing the use of fossil energy in order to contribute to the mitigation of climate change. This
paper regards renewable energy use as a specific type of environmental CSR: it benefits society
through climate change mitigation while it generally does not provide direct benefits to the firm
(i.e. lower costs) and is not required by law.
An extensive amount of papers empirically investigates the link between profit and (en-
vironmental) CSR. Although some of these papers find a negative or no linear relationship,
most papers establish a positive linear relationship between profit and (environmental) CSR.
This positive linear relationship is supported by several meta-analyses, both for CSR in general
(Margolis et al., 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003) and environmental CSR
in particular (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013). A positive relationship seems to imply the existence
of a win-win: CSR activities that benefit the environment are associated to higher firm profit
as well. In contrast to the previous literature, based on stakeholder theory arguments, Barnett
and Salomon (2012) theorize and empirically find a U shaped relationship between profit and
CSR, i.e. that firms with low and high levels of CSR generate higher profit than firms with
intermediate levels of CSR. They argue that, because firms require an adequate level of CSR
expenditure before they can influence their stakeholders, firms are only able to profit from CSR
expenditure when CSR expenditure reaches a sufficiently high level.
Taking on a microeconomic perspective, a positive relationship between profit and envi-
1See Hulshof et al. (2019) for more information on renewable energy certificate prices in Europe. For reference,
the average wholesale electricity price was about e 45 per MWh in the past decade in Northwest Europe.
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ronmental CSR in general and renewable energy use in particular is not conform expectation
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). On the one hand, renewable energy use can enable the firm to
differentiate itself from competitors such that it can serve consumers with a higher willingness
to pay and charge them higher prices. On the other hand, competition for those consumers
is expected to drive down prices to the level of marginal costs. Furthermore, regarding firms’
reported environmental concerns, it appears questionable as to whether firms are willing to use
renewable energy at the expense of profit, as this directly contradicts the assumption that firms
maximize profit. But if this would be the case, the decline in profit due to the use of renewable
energy may be seen as the revealed willingness to pay of firms to contribute to climate-change
mitigation.
The main question we address is: what is the relationship between profit and environmental
CSR? In particular, we are interested in the relationship between profit and renewable energy
use, a specific type of environmental CSR. The main contribution of this paper is that, rather
than relying on indicator variables for environmental CSR (such as the KLD or ASSET4 score
indicators), of which it is unclear whether they accurately reflect the true level of a firm’s
environmental CSR (e.g. Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013), this paper relies on data regarding firms’
renewable energy use, as a concrete measure for a specific type of environmental CSR.
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between profit and renewable energy use.
Our analytical framework relies on the theory of product differentiation in a profit-maximization
framework, as discussed in a seminal paper by Rosen (1974). This framework appears appro-
priate since, from a profit-maximization perspective, the only justification for using renewable
energy is that the firm can differentiate itself from competitors (e.g. gain a better reputa-
tion) and serve consumers with a higher willingness to pay for this type of product quality,
as renewable energy is more expensive and provides no technological advantages. Based on
this analytical framework, we expect no relationship between profit and renewable energy use.
If the empirical findings are not in accordance with this prediction, this might suggest that
other explanations for renewable energy use by firms are more appropriate, such as altruistic
environmental concerns.
The empirical analysis uses panel data for the period 2014–2018. The panel consists of 920
firms from 59 countries from a very large number of sectors. We find no evidence for a significant
relationship between profit and renewable energy use, which is conform expectation based on
microeconomic theory. From the results, there seems to be no win-win from renewable energy
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use in the form of higher profit and a better environment. In addition, the results suggest that
firms do not use renewable energy at the expense of profit, which could have signaled a positive
willingness to pay for the environment of firms. Instead, the relationship is neutral and firms
are exactly compensated for their increased cost from using renewable energy. On the basis of
using renewable energy as specific measure of environmental CSR, the findings of this paper do
not corroborate the positive relationship between environmental CSR and profit (i.e. that it
pays to be good/green), which is frequently established in the literature.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the theoret-
ical and empirical literature. The third section discusses the analytical framework. The fourth
section describes the methods applied in this paper, in particular the empirical model, data
and estimation method. The fifth section provides the results and discussion. A final section
concludes.
2 Literature review
A central microeconomic assumption is that firms aim to maximize their profit and that firm
behavior can be largely explained from this objective. For several decades, the (by now sub-
stantial) empirical CSR literature has been largely occupied with investigating how CSR ex-
penditure relates to this central microeconomic assumption. We first discuss the link between
profit and (environmental) CSR from a theoretical perspective. Consequently, we discuss the
findings in the empirical literature. Finally, this section discusses renewable energy use by firms
in particular. Considering the similarity between papers that focus on the general CSR-profit
relationship and the environmental CSR-profit relationship, this section discusses papers from
both the general CSR and environmental CSR literature.
2.1 Theoretical link between profit and environmental CSR
Economic theory has suggested two main theoretical explanations for the presence of (environmental-
)CSR goods in firms’ profit-maximizing bundle of inputs. First of all, (environmental) CSR can
be part of profit maximization when it enables product differentiation. In contrast to firms
active in markets with homogeneous goods, firms active in markets with differentiated goods
may be able to charge a higher price than competitors (e.g. Rosen, 1974). Taking on a theory
of the firm perspective, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) theorize that CSR expenditure can result
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in product attributes that are valued by consumers. The authors propose that firms, like for
other inputs, trade-off the costs and benefits of CSR expenditure and select the quantity of
CSR where the marginal costs and benefits are equalized. Considering the possibility to switch
between CSR strategies, they theorize that no relationship between profit and CSR exists. A
primary example of how firms differentiate themselves from competitors is reputation building
through (environmental) CSR expenditure (e.g. Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007; McWilliams and
Siegel, 2011).
Secondly, the profit-maximizing way to produce any quantity is where the production costs
are minimized. Besides that several clean production technologies or inputs may be cheaper than
polluting alternatives,2 some authors have pointed out more subtle mechanisms through which
environmental CSR can be part of cost-minimization. Porter and Van der Linde (1995) note
that many types of environmental CSR investments are characterized by high initial investment
costs which ultimately lead to cost reductions that offset the initial investment costs.3 Another
argument is that costly environmental CSR may prevent governments from imposing even more
costly regulation (e.g. Davis, 1973; Carroll and Shabana, 2010).
2.2 Empirical evidence
A large empirical literature regarding the link between environmental CSR in particular or CSR
in general and profit has emerged. The vast majority of these papers tries to relate measures
of profit (e.g. net income, return on assets or Tobin’s Q) to measures of (environmental) CSR
(predominantly indicators of (environmental) CSR based on the KLD or ASSET4 scores). The
difference between papers that focus on environmental CSR and papers that focus on all types
of CSR is that the former generally measures CSR over environmental aspects only, whereas
the latter measures CSR over all aspects. In other respects, the methodology in the two strands
of literature is often similar. While the evidence is not fully consistent between studies, most
papers appear to find a positive linear relationship between (environmental) CSR and profit
(e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997). This positive linear relationship is confirmed by several
meta-analyses, for environmental CSR in particular (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013), and for CSR
2E.g. energy efficiency measures. It must be noted that it is somewhat doubtful whether these type of
production inputs can be considered as CSR because, in addition to external benefits, they also generate direct
private benefits to the firm. This is not the case for renewable energy considering that it is generally more
expensive than non-renewable energy.
3Porter and Van der Linde (1995) also suggest that regulation is required for firms to be willing to invest in
many types of CSR because they believe that firms generally fail at making optimal choices inter-temporally, i.e.
fail at minimizing costs/maximizing profit over the long run.
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in general (Margolis et al., 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003).
Deviating from previous approaches, Barnett and Salomon (2012) theorize and empirically
find a U shaped relationship between firm profit and CSR. They propose that, in order to profit
from CSR actions, the level of CSR needs to surpass a certain threshold for otherwise the firm’s
stakeholders will not react in a profitable manner. Their argument is based on a stakeholder
argument, namely that a firm’s capability to influence their stakeholders depends on the level
of CSR. The paper argues that, at low levels of CSR, a firm has few abilities to influence their
stakeholders because those stakeholders will not perceive social actions by the firm as very
credible and therefore not respond in a profitable manner. In contrast, at high levels of CSR,
a firm has the ability to influence their stakeholders because those stakeholders will perceive
social actions by the firm as credible and therefore respond in a profitable manner (in this case
“such actions are in consonance with the firms character”).
The majority of the papers in this literature have been criticized for the typical use of
indicator variables for (environmental) CSR, often based on the KLD or ASSET4 scores. This
type of indicator variable is usually based on ranking firms on a large number of CSR-related
aspects which are then transformed into a single firm-level CSR score. These indicator variables
have mainly become popular because it is difficult to measure CSR objectively. Inherently,
there is a degree of subjectivity and arbitrariness present in the methodologies underlying such
indicators (e.g. selection of aspects and aspect score calculation). Because of these problems, the
validity of these indicators to represent actual environmental or social performance has been
questioned (e.g. Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Chatterji et al., 2009;
Semenova and Hassel, 2015). An exception is Konar and Cohen (2001), who use data regarding
emissions of toxic chemicals and pending environmental lawsuits and also find a positive linear
relationship with profit.
A second critique is the widespread (incorrect) use of ratio variables in this literature, both
as dependent and independent variable (e.g. return on assets or toxic chemical emissions per
dollar revenue) (Barnett and Salomon, 2012), which may lead to spurious results in regression
analysis (e.g. Kronmal, 1993).
Another branch of papers has verified the direction of causality in the relationship between
profit and CSR. The concern of these papers is that CSR expenditure may be determined
by profitability, rather than the other way around, because it is “inessential” expenditure. If
valid and unaccounted for, this reverse causality problem could lead to biased estimates from
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conventional estimation techniques. However, explicitly addressing the direction of causality,
Kang et al. (2016) and Scholtens (2008) find evidence that causality runs from CSR to profit
and not the other way around.
2.3 Renewable energy use by firms
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on renewable energy consumption by firms. In recent
years, there has been a marked increase in the demand for renewable energy from firms. This
can be seen for example from the steep increase in participation by firms in voluntary renewable
energy programs in which they pledge or articulate their intention to increase their renewable
energy use. Two primary examples are the U.S. EPA’s Green Power Partnership (GPP) program
and the RE100. The former experienced an increase in the number of participants from 656 in
2006 to 1532 in 2018. Collectively, participants consumed 55TWh of renewable electricity in
2018 (EPA, 2019). The RE100 experienced an increase from 50 participating firms in 2015 to 155
in 2018 with an aggregate renewable electricity consumption of 72TWh in 2017 (RE100, 2018).4
Based on survey findings, PWC (2016) reports that meeting sustainability goals and reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is the primary motivation for firms in the U.S. to buy renewable
energy.
The primary tool for firms to consume renewable energy is the procurement of renewable
energy certificates (RECs), which have become the dominant market mechanism for consump-
tion of renewable electricity (Hulshof et al., 2019). RECs are administered to renewable energy
producers, which can then be sold separately from the energy to end-users who wish to claim
the consumption of renewable energy. Firms buy RECs either (i) directly as unbundled product,
i.e. separately from their electricity product, or (ii) as a bundled product consisting of both
RECs and electricity from a retailer or producer. Method (i) accounted for 55% of the total
renewable energy consumption of GPP partners in 2018 and for 46% of the total consumption
of RE100 participants in 2017. Method (ii) accounted for 40% of the total renewable energy
consumption of GPP partners in 2018 and 35% of the total consumption of RE100 participants
in 2017 (EPA, 2019; RE100, 2018).
4For reference, total electricity consumption in Chile, Italy and the U.S. in 2017 was 75TWh, 315TWh and
4,098TWh respectively (IEA, 2019).
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3 Analytical framework
This paper’s analytical framework is based on the seminal paper about vertical product differen-
tiation by Rosen (1974). Theory about product differentiation provides the suitable framework
because it is the principal mechanism through which renewable energy relates to (economic)
profit of the firm. Products are vertically (as opposed to horizontally) differentiated when, at
a given price, everybody prefers a product (or is indifferent) when more of a particular char-
acteristic is present. This seems to apply to renewable energy as well. It is clear that some
individuals prefer goods with environmental-friendly attributes (e.g. Bjørner et al., 2004) and,
despite that some individuals may be indifferent, there is no reason to dislike the use of renew-
able energy in production. This section provides an interpretation of Rosen’s model when goods
are vertically differentiated on the basis of firms’ renewable energy use with several assumptions
that are specific to this case. We discuss the main insights and implications for the relationship
with firm profit from adopting this framework.
A key element in Rosen’s model is the dependence of the market price (p) on the presence of
a number (n) of valuable characteristics (z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn)), which he refers to as the hedonic
price function p(z). Here, it is assumed that products are differentiated on the basis of a single
attribute, renewable energy (z = RE). Firms are price takers but have some control over the
price they can charge by using more or less RE. We will make the specific assumption that firms
can modify the product’s renewable energy characteristic by simply buying the desired amount
of renewable energy certificates at the prevailing market price, reflecting actual practice. In
terms of the firm’s cost function C(M,RE), where M is the quantity produced, this translates
to assuming that the marginal cost of adding renewable energy is constant i.e. ∂C∂RE > 0 and
∂2C
∂RE2
= 0. Moreover, buying renewable energy certificates does not lead in any way to changes
in the physical production process and there are basically no interactions with other production
inputs.5 Further, we assume that firms have the same cost function. While this may not
reflect reality for other product characteristics and inputs, it can be justified for the case of
renewable energy on the basis that firms do not transform other inputs into the renewable
energy characteristic but simply buy it from certificate retailers.
5The assumptions on the cost function are chosen to reflect differentiation on the basis of renewable energy
in practice. This includes assuming there exist no entry barriers in the form of a fixed cost associated to
choosing a certain renewable energy/quality level, as in Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1987). With renewable energy,
firms merely change the desired amount of certificates and pay the associated marginal certificate price when
choosing/changing the desired quality level instead of paying a significant fixed costs.
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Firms then maximize profit pi = Mp(RE)−C(M,RE). The first order conditions that yield











(2) gives the relationship between profit and renewable energy use, when evaluated at M∗. The
first term (M ∂p∂RE ) gives the marginal revenue of increasing RE whereas the second term (
∂C
∂RE )
is the marginal cost of increasing RE. Notice that the marginal cost of RE per unit of output is
equal to ∂C∂RE /M
∗. This is the firm’s minimally required price increase to be willing to to increase
its use of RE, i.e. the marginal reservation price for RE. Because of the assumption that firms
have the same cost function, this is identical for all firms. According to (2), in the optimum, the




we assume a competitive market, prices will equal the producers’ reservation price. This implies
that ∂p∂RE is fully determined by
∂C
∂RE /M
∗.6 Under these assumptions, the hedonic price curve
and the producers’ common RE marginal reservation price curve coincide and (2) is satisfied
at any choice of RE. Moreover, since the marginal cost of certificates is constant, the slope of
the marginal reservation price curve and therefore the hedonic price curve is also constant. In
terms of (2), ∂
2p
∂RE2
= 0 because ∂
2C
∂RE2
= 0 by assumption.7 Figure 1 draws the relevant producer
reservation price curve (p(RE)) as a function of the renewable energy characteristic.8
From the perspective of some consumers, more of the renewable energy input may be pre-
ferred and the willingness to pay of these individuals increases with the amount of renewable
energy accordingly. However, since buying a good with more renewable energy (at a higher
price) means lower consumption of other goods, the marginal willingness to pay for the RE
characteristic is decreasing, conform the usual properties of a utility function. In terms of fig-
ure 1, this can be shown by introducing a special type of consumer indifference curve, which
6Individual firms take the hedonic price curve and its slope as exogenous as they are assumed to be price
takers.
7Assuming non-constant marginal cost of renewable energy merely changes the shape of the reservation price
curve (e.g. convex), but not the qualitative conclusions regarding the expected relationship between profit and
renewable energy from this theoretical framework.
8Where relevant refers to the reservation price curve corresponding to the competitive-industry profit level
(pipc). Rosen (1974) shows that a whole family of parallel reservations price curves exist (i.e. all with slope
∂C
∂RE
/M∗), each corresponding to a different profit level. From assuming a competitive market, the relevant
reservation price is the one associated to pipc.
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Rosen calls the bid curve (θ). The bid curve reflects a consumer’s willingness to pay for the
good at different RE levels, while holding the level of utility constant.9 As with conventional
indifference curves, a whole family of parallel bid curves exist. Consumers prefer bundles to
the south-east corner (i.e. a lower price for a given amount of RE) but are constrained by
the market price. Their optimal choice is characterized by a tangency condition between their
indifference curve and the hedonic price curve (essentially the budget constraint), corresponding
here to the competitive firm’s reservation price curve. Figure 1 draws the bid curves of two
example consumers, which optimally choose two different levels of RE. When the preferences of
consumers for the RE characteristics are very heterogeneous or “spread out”, as is assumed in
Rosen (1974) and here, the points of tangency with the producer reservation price curve occur
at all levels of RE. In other words, at any choice of RE, firms can find consumers that prefer
exactly that type.
What are the implications for the relationship between profit and renewable energy use?
The outcome of the model is that the choice of RE does not matter for profit as firms are al-
ways exactly compensated for the increased costs of using more renewable energy. By increasing
RE, costs increase but revenues also increases in an exactly offsetting manner because the good
can be sold at a higher price.10 In other words, this theoretical framework predicts that there






Figure 1: Producer (p) and consumer (θi) reservation prices for the renewable energy
characteristic
9In figure 1, the vertical axis measures the amount spend on the good, as it is assumed that consumers buy
one unit, which therefore equals the foregone expenditure on other goods. The bid curve is therefore an inverted
conventional indifference curve (trading off consumption of the good with varying levels of the RE attribute
versus consumption of other goods), with slope equal to minus the slope of a conventional indifference curve.
10Assuming consumers have perfect information on product qualities in terms of RE.
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One of our critical (but arguably realistic) assumptions that drives this prediction is that
firms have access to exactly the same technology/cost function to add the renewable energy
characteristic, namely by simply buying the desired amount of certificates at a constant price.
In contrast, assuming differences exist in firms’ cost function, the general model in Rosen (1974)
predicts that there will be a single optimal choice of RE for an individual firm and deviating
in any direction from the optimum would hurt profit.
The subsequent empirical analysis tests this prediction that is derived from taking on a
profit-maximization perspective with vertical product differentiation in a perfectly competitive
environment. Given that alternative explanations of environmental CSR behavior cannot be
true at the same time (e.g. one alternative explanation being that firms engage in green behavior
for environmental reasons and at the expense of profit), we investigate the specific explanation
that renewable energy use follows from profit maximization and that firms will only do so if
they are compensated for it (in an offsetting manner due to competition).
4 Method
4.1 Empirical model
Using panel data, we estimate a regression model that relates firm profit (pi) to renewable energy
use (RE), in addition to several control variables that may correlate both with firm profit and
renewable energy use. One specification allows for a curvilinear relationship between pi and RE
by including a quadratic term to test for the presence of a U shaped relationship, as found by
Barnett and Salomon (2012). We estimate the following equation:
piti = β0 + β1REti + β2RE
2
ti + β3TEti + β4Dti + β5Ati + ci +αYti + ti (3)
where t refers to the time period and i to the firm.
The model includes total energy use (TE) as independent variable because it may correlate
with both RE and pi: renewable energy use is by definition a component of total energy use
while the profitability of firms may also be related to the firm’s (or industry’s) energy intensity.11
Debt (D) is included as control variable as debt may influence managers’ behavior for two
reasons (e.g. Barnett and Salomon, 2012). On the one hand, higher debt may encourage decision
11The correlation coefficient between renewable and total energy use is 0.42.
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making conform pure profit maximization. On the other hand, it may also reduce firms’ ability
to execute profitable investment opportunities due to possible capital constraints. When this
affects firms’ decisions to buy renewable energy, omitting debt would bias our estimate of the
effect of renewable energy on profit. Assets (A) is included as independent variable to control
for firm size. While total energy use may also be regarded as an indicator for firm size, it is an
imprecise measure of firm size since larger firms may have a relatively low energy intensity (e.g
larger firms in the financial and staffing sectors), which is therefore complemented with another
measure of size.
c refers to an unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effect. In this case, this may capture
differences in the unobserved ability of firms’ management. Y is a vector of year-sector inter-
action dummies which are equal to one for firm i in year t if the firm belongs to the respective
sector and zero otherwise. This may capture for example macroeconomic fluctuations pertain-
ing to a specific sector.  is an error term which is assumed to be independent and identically
distributed with a mean of zero.
The model deliberately omits R&D expenditure as control variable, which is suggested
to be included by McWilliams and Siegel (2000) for models linking CSR to profit. As the
procurement of RECs from producers or retailers is a simple administrative act, renewable
energy consumption is typically not expected to be relevant for firms’ product innovations
stemming from R&D expenditure. Including R&D expenditure does not materially change
our conclusion regarding the relationship between profit and renewable energy. The first two
columns in table A.1 in the Appendix report the results of the model with R&D expenditure
included as control variable.
4.2 Data
The data for this analysis comes from firms’ financial and environmental reports over the period
2014–2018, which we collect using Bloomberg. For this period, renewable energy use (in GWh)
is reported for 971 firms in one or more years, resulting in a total number of annual firm-year
observations for this variable of 2,696.12 The data on renewable energy use is complemented
with data for the other variables in (3): net income (in million US$) as a measure of profit,13
12Note that this includes all types of renewable energy, such as renewable electricity, renewable gas, renewable
hydrogen etc.
13I.e. after taxes, interest payments, depreciation and all other expenses. Note that this is a measure of
accounting profit and not economic profit.
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total energy use (in GWh),14 debt (in million US$, including short and long term debt) and
assets (in million US$).
The final panel dataset is unbalanced due to one or more missing observations in most of the
variables. In total, the final sample includes 2,581 firm-year observations for 920 firms. Firms
from all continents and sectors are included in the sample, where sectors are distinguished
according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) by FTSE Russell. The ICB classifi-
cation encompasses 114 sub-sectors, 41 sectors, 19 super-sectors and 10 industries, out of which
104, 39, 19 and 10 are represented in the sample. The ICB sectors are used for construction of
the year-sector dummy variables (195 in total of which one is omitted in estimation). Table 1
reports details about the geographical and industrial characteristics of the firms in our sample.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables.
Reporting about renewable energy use is voluntary and the incentive to report seems more
obvious for firms that use considerable amounts of renewable energy (i.e. green firms) than for
firms that do not. Therefore, a worry may be that firms that use hardly any renewable energy
are not represented in the database. However, considering that 9% (34%) of the firms in the
database have a renewable energy share (as percentage of total energy use) of less than 0.01%
(1%), we are not highly worried about this selection effect.
Table 1: Number of firm-years in sample by geography and industry
North South
World America America Europe Africa Asia Oceania
All sectors 2,581 608 177 1,068 36 628 64
Oil & gas 87 21 9 32 0 25 0
Basic materials 323 84 35 93 5 88 18
Industrials 554 108 27 247 5 156 11
Consumer goods 440 74 26 182 10 144 4
Health care 124 46 3 47 2 26 0
Consumer services 180 51 8 92 10 19 0
Telecommunications 95 10 11 55 1 13 5
Utilities 135 24 46 51 0 14 0
Financials 466 115 12 243 3 67 26
Technology 177 75 0 26 0 76 0
Source: Bloomberg
14Including all types of energy.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD (within) Minimum Maximum
Net income (mln US$) 1,292 2,223 -16,265 94,209
Renewable energy use (GWh) 1,413 1,925 0 106,884
Total energy use (GWh) 10,582 4,763 0.2 563,957
Share of renewable energy 18.0% 6.9% 0% 100%
Debt (mln US$) 19,514 6,891 0 699,564
Assets (mln US$) 78,910 18,900 19 2,622,532
Source: Bloomberg
4.3 Estimation method
The analysis applies a within-estimation procedure to estimate the coefficients of the model
in (3) because the unobserved time-invariant firm-specific affect may be correlated with both
firm profitability and the decision to use renewable energy. This implies using only variation
within the firm to estimate the effect of renewable energy on profit. Applying a random effects
estimation procedure, such that also between-firm variation is considered, does not materially
change our conclusion. The last two columns in table A.1 in the Appendix report the estimation
results from a random effects model.
The model in (3) is estimated twice: (i) the primary model restricts β2 = 0, in order to
test for the presence of a linear relationship between profit and renewable energy. This entails
testing the hypothesis that β1 = 0 against the alternative that β1 6= 0; and (ii) the model
without restrictions on β2 in order to test for the presence of a U shaped relationship between
profit and renewable energy. To test for the presence of a U shape, the analysis applies the test
proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010). Their formal test provides the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the presence of a U shape. The test entails testing the null hypothesis that a
monotone or inverse-U shape is present versus the alternative that a U shape is present.
Cluster-robust standard errors are computed because the autocorrelation test as proposed
by Wooldridge (2010) indicates the presence of autocorrelation. In addition, from residual plots,
it appears as if the predicted values become less accurate when the predicted value becomes
larger, i.e. the models seem to suffer from heteroskedasticity. The standard errors are clustered
at the level of the sub-sector based on the ICB classification (104 clusters).
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5 Results and discussion
Table 3 reports the estimation results. Based on model (i), we estimate a negative but highly
insignificant coefficient for renewable energy use (p=0.569), with a 95% confidence interval rang-
ing from [-0.047, 0.026]. Regarding the estimated size of the effect, for an increase in renewable
energy use of 10% for the mean firm (an increase of 141.3 GWh), this translates to an esti-
mated effect on profit of [-6.6 mln US$, 3.6 mln US$], i.e. between -0.5% and 0.3% of mean
profit. Hence, based on the full sample, we do not find evidence for a positive linear relation-
ship between profit and renewable energy use, as has frequently been empirically established,
including in meta analyses, for general indicators of (environmental) CSR (e.g. Orlitzky et al.,
2003; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013).
The coefficients for renewable energy and its square in model (ii) have the required signs
for a U shaped relationship with profit but are not statistically significant (p=0.275 for RE
and p=0.278 for its square). In addition, the formal test for a U shape fails to reject the null-
hypothesis at conventional significance thresholds (p-value 0.142). These results do not support
the presence of a U shaped relationship between profit and renewable energy use.
The results show that there is no relationship between profit and renewable energy use.
This implies that firms are exactly compensated for an increase in costs when they use renew-
able energy. These results are in line with the predicted relationship in a profit-maximization
framework. In contrast with most other papers in the CSR literature, this paper does not find
evidence for a win-win in the form of a better environment and higher firm profit. In addition,
the results imply that firms are not sacrificing profit in favor of renewable energy use. Hence,
we do not find signals for a positive willingness to pay for renewable energy of firms in the sense
that they accept lower profits.
With respect to the other variables, conform expectation, an increase in the level of assets
is associated with a statistically significant increase in net income (p=0.026 and p=0.025 in
models (i) and (ii) respectively). On average, an increase in the level of assets by one million
US$ is associated to an increase in the level of profit by 0.02 million US$. For debt, we estimate
a negative and marginally statistically significant coefficient (p=0.082 and p=0.084 in models (i)
and (ii) respectively). We had no a priori expectation for this variable. The negative coefficients
are in line with the findings of Barnett and Salomon (2012). For total energy use, we estimate
a negative coefficient in model (i) and a positive coefficient in model (ii). These estimates are,
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however, highly insignificant (p=0.976 and p=0.864 in models (i) and (ii) respectively) and the
95% confidence intervals largely overlap ([-0.019, 0.019] and [-0.018, 0.021] in models (i) and
(ii) respectively). It appears that changes in energy intensity within a firm are not associated
to changes in net income. The estimated coefficients for the firm and year-sector fixed effects
are not reported to facilitate readability and because they are of limited interest.
Table 3: Fixed effects estimation results. Dependent variable: net income
Model (i) Model (ii)
Renewable energy use -0.010 -0.103
(0.569) (0.275)
(Renewable energy use)2 0.000001
(0.278)








Pseudo R2 0.24 0.24
No. of observations 2,581 2,581
No. of firms 920 920
Year-sector dummies+ Yes Yes
P-value in parentheses.
+ year-sector dummies are equal to one for firm i in year t
if the firm belongs to sector s and zero otherwise.
6 Conclusion
Firms buy renewable energy, a specific type of environmental CSR, at premiums and typically
report environmental as motivation to do so. The empirical environmental CSR literature seems
to suggest that there even exists a win-win from this type of firm behavior: more environmental
CSR is associated to higher profit levels.
From a microeconomic perspective, however, higher profit from environmental CSR in gen-
eral and renewable energy use in particular are not expected (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001).
On the one hand, firms may be able to differentiate themselves from competitors by using re-
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newable energy, or another type of environmental CSR, and thereby charge higher prices. On
the other hand, competition for those high-WTP consumers drives down prices towards the
level of marginal costs. In addition, if we assume that the objective of the firm is to maximize
profit, there is no scope for renewable energy use or environmental CSR at the expense of profit.
Therefore, in this profit-maximization framework, we expect that there exists no relationship
between profit and renewable energy use.
In this paper, we have analyzed the relationship between renewable energy use and firm
profit by using panel data of 920 firms from various regions and sectors over the period 2014–
2018. Also firms that use no or hardly any renewable energy are represented in the database.
The results suggest that there is no relationship between renewable energy use and profit.
The interpretation of this result is twofold. Firstly, for renewable energy use by firms, there does
not appear to exist a win-win in the sense that promoting social goals (a better environment) is
not associated to benefiting private goals (firm profit). In relation to the broader CSR literature,
our results do not corroborate the win-win relationship between (environmental) CSR and firm
profit that has frequently been established, including in meta-analyses (e.g Orlitzky et al., 2003;
Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013). Secondly, the results also imply that firms are not sacrificing profit
when they use renewable energy, which could have been an indication for a positive willingness
to pay for the environment by firms. These findings are in line with the expected relationship
between renewable energy use and profit in a profit-maximization framework. This appears to
indicate that firms do not have objectives beyond maximizing profit and that firms are only
willing to contribute to climate change mitigation through the purchase of renewable energy
when this contributes to the profit-maximization objective as well.
This paper’s main contribution is that, rather than relying on indicator variables of which
it is not clear to what extent they represent actual CSR levels, this analysis uses a more specific
and concrete measure of environmental CSR in the form of renewable energy use. However,
several caveats of the current study need to be mentioned. First, the data includes a highly
heterogeneous group of firms in terms of industry and origin. Some factors that are not explicitly
modeled could be related to the profitability of firms, particularly the competition intensity.
Although we attempt to control for such factors (e.g. through industry-time and firm dummies),
it can be valuable to study more homogeneous groups of firms. Secondly, the empirical analysis
uses net income as measure for profit, which is a measure of accounting profit, whereas the
theory concerns the relationship between economic profit and renewable energy use. Because
17
firms increasingly play an important contribution in societies’ efforts to mitigate climate change,
further research is required to analyze how these firm contributions fit within the objectives of
the firm.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Results of alternative specifications including R&D expenditure (ia and iia) and
random effects (RE) estimations (ib and iib). Dependent variable: net income
Model (ia) Model (iia) Model (ib) Model (iib)
FE-estimation FE-estimation RE-estimation RE-estimation
with R&D exp. with R&D exp. of eq. (3) of eq. (3)
RE -0.013 -0.135 0.001 0.017
(0.511) (0.210) (0.877) (0.536)
RE2 0.000001 -0.0000002
(0.213) (0.421)
TE 0.0004 0.002 0.006 0.006
(0.965) (0.821) (0.057) (0.086)
Debt -0.085 -0.084 0.0003 0.0003
(0.369) (0.374) (0.955) (0.955)
Assets 0.078 0.079 0.007 0.007
(0.127) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D -0.080 -0.055
(0.883) (0.919)
Constant -623.4 -564.8 1084.8 1091.2
(0.479) (0.524) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29
No. of obs. 2,117 2,117 2,581 2,581
No. of firms 769 769 920 920
Year-sector
dummies+ Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value in parentheses.
+ year-sector dummies are equal to one for firm i in year t if the firm belongs to sector
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